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Abstract— Social media application are becoming multimedia 
centric with live and stored video, audio, augmented reality, 
haptic, etc. emerging as the main categories of traffic. Their QoS 
requirements are more stringent than their legacy counterparts. 
At the carrier level, Software Defined – Wide Area Network (SD-
WAN) is one of the promising technologies for transporting these 
multimedia traffic. A SD-WAN will typically have a mesh of 
centralized controllers managing the networking infrastructure. 
Reliable operations of these controllers are a key requirement for 
the successful operation of the WAN. Controller failure will 
prevent the forwarding switches from communicating with the 
controller. This will prevent the switches from forwarding any new 
traffic, as well as flow entries from existing traffic will also time 
out after a period bringing the network to a standstill. Rebooting 
a controller or starting a new one will introduce delays degrading 
the QoS. This research presents an architecture for handling 
controller failure via transparent migration of the controller load 
in a semi-meshed controller environment. The architecture 
includes a real time cloud-based centralized storage of the flow 
states north of the controllers and a virtualized connection 
management unit at the south. The results demonstrate that the 
proposed model can transparently handle controller failure 
without affecting the QoS. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
From the communication point, the legacy social media 
applications have been generally text and image based and had 
long tolerable delay bounds but required lossless and error free 
network service to maintain appropriate level of Quality of 
Experience (QoE). The traditional networking infrastructure and 
communication models was adequate to provision appropriate 
network level Quality of Service (QoS) to support the QoE of 
the users. In this setup, most issues of reliability and fault 
resulting from the breakdown and fault of the infrastructure 
devices and links were handled by a slow rerouting process of 
the traffic and rebooting of the infrastructure. This however had 
minimal impact on the QoE of the users since the applications 
were inherently delay tolerant. In contrast, several of the present 
and emerging social media applications such as YouTube, 
Facebook, Snapchat, vTime, AltSpaceVR, etc. include 
multimedia such as video, audio and animation (both in 
streaming and real time interactive form) as well as multi 
sensorial media such as haptic, olfactory, gustation, etc. along 
with text-based media [1]. These wide varieties of media 
demand a much stringent QoS with seamless continuous and 
synchronized playback with minimal loss and error. This can be 
partially handled at the network level with adequate 
orchestration of network resources to keep delay and jitter at a 
minimal. However, without a comprehensive fault-tolerant 
framework, these network level QoS targets can be jeopardized 
resulting in the degradation of the QoE.   
This reliability concern is more serious in the context of the 
emerging SD-WAN networking model which is an extension of 
software defined networking (SDN) for enterprise and WAN. 
The model is based on two key concepts: a) decoupling of 
network control and transport functions into two separate planes 
and b) centralization of control and management. To realize this 
model, the architecture can be broadly classified into four key 
components (Fig. 1) across these two planes: 1) the forwarding 
switching fabric in the data plane, 2) the controller platform and 
the 3) northbound application programming interfaces (APIs) 
that controls the packet treatment in the control plane and the 4) 
southbound control/data plane signaling interface between the 
switches and the controller. In this model, the implication of 
network failure and fault is significantly different from 
traditional network. For example, in the context of packet 
treatment in a traditional network the forwarding decision is 
made either locally or based on intelligence gathered in co-
ordination between distributed forwarding devices. In this 
traditional set up, most local failure has minimal impact and only 




Fig. 1: The four components of the SD-WAN architecture 
However, in the SD-WAN model, failure and fault is more 
critical since control and network management is centralized at 
the control plane. This model can be categorized into three fault 
domains (Fig. 2). The forwarding fault domain includes failure 
in the data forwarding plane and includes switches and links. 
The interface fault domain involves failure of north bound and 
southbound interfaces. The northbound interface is generally a 
logical API based interface with the northbound applications 
running either locally on the controller platform itself or on a 
separate server. The southbound interface involves signaling 
APIs and physical communication interfaces between the 
forwarding devices and the controller(s). Finally, the controller 
fault domain involves failure in the control platform, the brain 
of the SD-WAN network responsible for network state 
aggregation, liaison with the northbound application and 
updating of the flow tables of the forwarding devices. 
 
Fig. 2: Categorization of the SD-WAN architecture into failure and fault domains  
A fault in the switch or link in the forwarding domain of a 
SD-WAN network is simpler in some aspect to similar situation 
in a traditional WAN network. In the SD-WAN, the flow rules 
of the faulty switch in the centralized controller are unaffected 
and the controller can temporarily reorganize the topology to 
bypass the faulty region. Similar action can be taken for faulty 
links. Once the switch or link is replaced, the topology can be 
updated without any additional delay in relearning the topology. 
The other two fault domains, the interface and the control 
domain are critical and go hand-in-hand as a fault in one has a 
cascading effect on the other and will result in the failure of the 
entire network. When there is a fault in either of these two 
domains, the data plane will not be able to receive any flow table 
updates and existing entries will also eventually timeout. This 
will bring the entire network to a standstill. Several papers have 
referred to the significance of this problem; however, most 
works have primarily focused on the problems in the data 
forwarding plane [2, 3]. 
Reliable fault-tolerant solutions of the control and interface 
domain are crucial for the wide scale deployment of the SD-
WAN by carriers and telecom operators for forwarding social 
multimedia and other categories of time critical and isochronous 
traffic. A controller could fail for various reasons such as of 
server crash, power failure, security breach, etc. Similarly, the 
link between the controller and the switches can also break. In 
this paper, the focus is not on failure avoidance but on recovery 
after failure through transparent load migration with minimal 
disruption of the services. Here a network is considered to be 
consisting of a semi meshed set of controllers which is the ideal 
setup in both enterprise and carrier grade SD-WAN. The rest of 
the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief analysis 
of the traffic characteristics of social multimedia traffic and the 
significance of a fault-tolerant reliable networking 
infrastructure; Section 3 presents related work on fault tolerance 
in softwarized networks; Section 4 describes the architecture of 
the proposed fault- tolerant control plane model. For 
performance comparison, an alternative fully meshed model is 
also presented. This however is not scalable but suitable as a 
benchmark for comparison; in section 5 the simulation results of 
the performance of these models in a mininet environment with 
POX [4] controllers is discussed; and finally section 6 evaluates 
the nobility of the work and presents the concluding remarks. 
II. SOCIAL MULTIMEDIA TRAFFIC CHARACTERISTICS 
There are wide categories of social media applications 
ranging from blogging, image sharing, video streaming, live 
video, interactive animation to augmented reality with 
multisensory data. These applications generate a wide variety of 
traffic profiles and have different levels of QoS requirements in 
order to provide the optimal level of QoE for the end users. For 
example, text centric blogging sites generate text-based data 
which require loss and error free service but is relatively 
tolerable to reasonable end to end delay 800 milliseconds.  
Hence, these data are packetized in larger packets since longer 
packetization delay is not a concern. Also, these types of social 
media sites generally produce bursty traffic. On the other hand, 
live video/audio and augmented reality traffic have a much 
smaller end to end delay bound of 200 – 250 milliseconds and 
hence have a smaller packet size to limit the packetization delay. 
The traffic is continuous with either isochronous or synchronous 
characteristics with very limited tolerable jitter. Here, any small 
disruption in the transmission will immediately result in the 
impairment of the QoE. Hence, the reliability of the 
infrastructure is crucial. In the SDN-WAN environment, due to 
the centralization of the control plane any fault in the controller 
will have cascading impact on the performance of the 
forwarding devices resulting in additional latency and delay for 
the applications [5]. Therefore, a reliable control plane that is 
robust and fast in managing fault is vital in SD-WAN. 
III. RELATED WORK 
The SD-WAN controller manages the flow entries of the 
forwarding switches by sending the required commands that 
 
 
either create new or update  existing flow entries within the flow 
tables in the WAN switches [6]. Hence, it is vital to continue the 
operation of the control plane in the case of controller failure in 
order to maintain the proper operation of SD-WAN and the 
related services. 
There are a number of open source and commercially 
available controller products in the market. Some of these have 
evolved as a community driven initiative such as NOX/POX, 
OpenDaylight, Floodlight, Open Network Operating System 
(ONOS) [7,8] whereas other came from established networking 
industry vendors such as Juniper’s Contrail, HP’s Virtual 
Application Network (VAN), Cisco’s Application Centric 
Infrastructure (ACI), etc. In most of these products, the main 
focus is on the reliability and fault tolerance of the switches and 
links in the forwarding domain. In the control domain some of 
the fault tolerance approaches include fast reboot of the failed 
controller, redundancy across controller cluster [9], using 
centralized database for fault tolerance and replication [10], 
optimization of the location of the controller in the subnet [11], 
etc. There are big questions on the scalability and performance 
of these solutions in terms of recovery time and loss [12]. 
There are a number of ongoing researches specifically 
focused on the fault tolerance issues of the controller. [13] 
proposed a fault-tolerant procedure based on a distributed 
control layer. This distributed controller architecture claims to 
improve the availability, reliability and efficiency of the 
softwarized network. The work is based on   an external Java 
based open-source toolkit named JGroups [14]. It can be used to 
discover and cluster networks elements by broadcasting or 
unicasting control messages among the network resident hosts. 
It supports the functionality of networks monitoring and failure 
detection. During controller failure,    it performs load balancing 
among the controllers by dynamically migrating the forwarders 
from one controller to another.  
Kim et al. presented another methodology for SDN 
controller’s fault-tolerance which includes building controller’s 
failure detection and recovery procedure inside a software 
module named CORONET [15]. Here, the failure detection 
method is based on a heartbeat mechanism that can be used to 
monitor a network device’s status. It is represented by packets 
being broadcasted at regular intervals within a network [16]. As 
for the recovery, it uses a distributed dictionary or hash table 
hosted on the Onix distributed control platform [17]. 
[18] presented a mechanism for SDN failure recovery using 
the OpenFlow protocol.  In this mechanism, the lifespan of a 
flow state entry in the switch is varied to recover from a failure. 
Here the arrival time of the last packet of each flow is recorded 
and the expiration interval of the flow entries is managed by 
using an idle and hard timeout period: The idle-timeout is the 
idle interval in which if no packet is matched by a flow it will be 
purged.  The hard timeout is the interval after which a flow entry 
will be removed from the flow table regardless of how many 
packets are matched [19]. These timeout signaling primitives are 
part of the standard fields of the OpenFlow protocol and can be 
managed by the controller without any external module. 
On the forwarding domain, there has been substantial 
volume of work dealing with switch failure and recovery. [20] 
presented a model for fault recovery in OpenFlow switches 
using a reliable proactive and reactive mechanism.  In the 
proactive case, the controller calculates an alternative path 
before the occurrence of a switch fault, whereas in reactive, the 
controller will calculate the alternative path after it has been 
notified of a switch failure. The work suggests storing all the 
policies, rules and flow tables of the SDN resident switches in a 
single compressed controller unit. In the case of a switch failure, 
the controller will react by switching to the alternative path in 
order to be able to connect to the rest of the forwarders that 
reside on the other side of the failed switch. In addition, it will 
update the alive switches with the alternative path from a 
network-wide compressed forwarding state table. 
Another approach used by some of the controllers [21] is the 
use of clustering to diminish the probability of the single point 
of failure and also to provide load balancing functionality. 
Clustering has been demonstrated to increase the scalability, 
performance and reliability of a network with the increase in the 
number of clustered controllers. However, controller clustering 
requires adequate synchronization of the flow rules among the 
controllers. Another related approach is to interconnect the 
software defined switches to multiple controllers to handle 
failure [22]. In this case, the first controller is treated as a master 
and the rest as slaves. This however requires a transparent 
handover phase for the switch to migrate from a master to a slave 
during failure. 
Our proposed architecture addresses some of the 
shortcomings of the research work discussed above and builds 








Fig. 3: Architecture of the fault-tolerant SD-WAN control platform 
Fig. 3 presents the architecture of the SD-WAN fault-
tolerant framework for the deployment of a reliable SD-WAN 
in a distributed controller-based environment. Having a 
distributed set of controllers provide the reliability, 
redundancy and scalability as required in a WAN 
environment. In the framework, each controller directly 
manages a set of physical and/or virtual switches and act as 
the primary master controller for the set. In addition, a 
controller may also act in parallel as a secondary slave 
controller for a different set of switches. The slave controller 
temporarily takes over as the primary controller for a set only 
when the master controller is unavailable. The switches are 
connected to the controllers through an intermediate controller 
monitor called here as the SD-WAN Controller Monitor 
(SCM). This logical unit can be implemented as a virtualized 
distributed network function unit like a Network Function 
Virtualization (NFV) component. This unit is responsible for 
monitoring the status of the controllers and detection of 
failures.  It checks the status of the connection by regularly 
broadcasting hello messages to the controllers which are 
replied back if the controller is alive. If a failure is detected, 
the SCM is then responsible to transfer the connections of all 
the switches from the primary master to the secondary slave 
controller. At the northbound interface of each of the 
controllers, it is connected to a cloud-based centralized 
database which stores a copy of the flow rules. It is stored as 
a hash table for easy retrieval and can be invoked through 
application programming interface (API). When a controller 
failure is detected by the SCM, a copy of the flow table of the 
failed controller is migrated from the cloud to the 
corresponding secondary slave controller which takes over the 
control of all the switches from the former and operates as a 
temporary acting master controller for them. At a later stage, 
when the failed controller becomes alive again, it updates it 
current state from the cloud and the SCM transfers back the 
control of the switches. This whole process of failure, transfer 
of control and recovery of the controller is transparent to the 
switches. 
V.  THE BENCHMARK CONTROL PLATFORM 
This model is used here only as a benchmark to compare 
the performance of our model above against this ideal 
scenario. In this setup (Fig. 4), all the switches are connected 
to all the controllers in the subnet in parallel in a fully meshed 
configuration. All the controllers receive the same flow 
information  and  maintain  identical  flow  tables.   However, 
Fig. 4: The Benchmark control platform 
from the controller to switch communication, the switch 
receives identical replies from each of the controllers but only 
processes the first copy and drops the other remaining copies. 
This setup ensures the performance of the switches are 
completely unaffected by the any particular controller failure. 
Although this solution is not scalable in a real implementation, 
it is suitable here for comparison purpose. 
VI. EXPERIMENT SETUP AND RESULTS 
A. Setup 
The SD-WAN network was designed using Mininet with 
POX controllers and Open vSwitch (OVS) switches. 
OpenFlow was used for southbound signaling and the SCM 
and the cloud-based hash tables’ remote procedures were 
written in the Python programming language for compatibility 
with POX’s Python core. All the connections between the 
switches and the SCM as well as between the controllers and 
the cloud were setup using TCP sockets. The iPerf3 [23] 
toolkit was used to configure and capture flow statistics. The 
htop [24] package was used to measure the memory and CPU 
usage of the various modules. 
The SD-WAN network was configured with eight OVS 
and four controllers (Fig. 3). Each of the controllers directly 
managed two switches acting as their primary master 
controller. In addition, each controller also acted as the 
secondary slave controller for a different set of switches. The 
secondary slave controller for the switches managed by 
controller-1 was set to controller-2, those managed by 
controller-2 was set to controller-3 and so on. The link rates 
were configured at 100 mbps and the aggregated social 
multimedia traffic load were kept at 60mbps. A mixture of 
flows with different start and inter-arrival times with a range 
of packet length distribution were used to simulate different 
categories of social multimedia traffic. All experiments were 
run for 90 seconds; however, the first 30 seconds were only 
for stabilizing the network and the flow tables. Hence, we only 
focus on the last 60 seconds duration in our discussion.  In this 
60 second interval, the controller failure was set at the 4th 




Before analyzing the performance of our model, the first 
experiment shows the impact of hard and idle timeout on the 
performance of the open vSwitch during controller failure. As 
mentioned earlier, idle timeout is the maximum idle interval 
for an existing flow entry to be matched with a new packet 
arrival; otherwise the entry is deleted from the forwarding 
table. Hard timeout is the maximum duration of a flow table 
entry after which it is purged irrespective of the amount of 
matching traffic. In this first experiment, we compare the 
performance of the OVS in three scenarios. In the first two 
cases, there are no fault-tolerant mechanisms in the network. 
In one case, only the idle timeout set to 30 seconds, and in the 
other the hard timeout set to zero. This is compared against 
the performance of the benchmark controller.  In all 
subsequent experiments, only hard timeout is used to clearly 
distinguish the performance gain of the proposed SD-WAN 
platform without the assistance of any idle timeout period. 
 
Fig. 5: Impact of timeout period on the throughput of a switch during 
controller failure 
Fig. 5 shows the impact of the failure of the controller on 
the traffic load of the directly connected OVS. As mentioned, 
the proposed fault-tolerant platform has not been considered 
here. Instead the timeout impact in the two cases have been 
compared against the benchmark model. In the result, the 
OVS in the benchmark threshold model is completely 
transparent to the failure since it has direct connection with all 
the controllers and therefore it continues to receive openflow 
messages from the other identical controllers after the failure. 
In the case with 30 second idle timeout, all existing flows 
continued to be unaffected for 30 seconds depending on the 
last packet arrival. New flows however were dropped along 
with packets from existing flows which were idle for more 
than 30 seconds. In the case with zero second hard timeout, 
the throughput of the switch immediately becomes zero after 
the controller failure. The result shows that idle timeout 
duration can partly compensate the throughput of a switch 
connected to a failed controller. However, it is challenging to 
select an optimal timeout period that on one hand during fault 
will provide transparent continuity of the social multimedia 
traffic and maintain its QoE, and on the other hand during 
normal condition will still ensure that the flow table entries 
are still valid and up-to-date and have not become obsolete 
due to dynamic route changes. 
 
Fig. 6: Comparison of performance between the benchmark and the fault-
tolerant models 
Fig. 6 shows the comparison of the performance of the 
fault-tolerant SD-WAN platform with the benchmark model 
in dealing with controller failure. Here the effect of controller 
failure is monitored at a finer granularity by inspecting the 
performance of an individual flow passing through the OVS 
connected to the failed controller-1. At the 4th second, 
immediately after the failure the SCM control monitor passes 
the control of the switch to the secondary slave controller 
(controller-2) and the associated flow rules are transferred 
from the cloud. The process takes less than 200 milliseconds 
and 0.06% of the traffic during the period is lost. This minimal 
disruption of the social multimedia traffic can be readily 
handled at the application level in the end systems using 
various adaptive techniques [5]. Moreover, with a realistic idle 
timeout period like in the previous experiment, this loss can 
be further reduced close to zero. At the 44th second, when the 
controller becomes alive again control is passed back to the 
original primary controller. There is no loss during this 
handover process which takes place only after the controller 
is up and running and has synched the flow rules from the 
cloud. The result shows the flow rate has been almost 
unaffected by the controller failure and is identical to the 
benchmark model. Similarly, it was found that for the 
aggregate traffic passing through the switch the overall 
throughput remained unaffected.  
 
Fig. 7: Impact of timeout period on the throughput of a switch during 
controller failure 
The change in load distribution across the controllers 
during the experiment run is presented in Fig. 7. After the 
failure, the number of switches managed by controller-2 goes 
up from two to four as it now acts as the primary controller for 
its own two switches as well as for the two switches from 
controller-1. Detail inspection of controller resource usage 
also show that the memory and CPU utilization increased 
from 18% to 30% during this stage. This later again returns 
 
 
back to the earlier state when controller-1 comes alive and is 
transferred back the management of its two switches. 
VII. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The results demonstrate that the proposed fault-tolerant 
SD-WAN platform can handle controller failure in a 
distributed controller-based SD-WAN environment. Both the 
coarse level aggregate throughput of a switch and the granular 
level individual flow rate of the social multimedia traffic were 
negligibly affected by the failure of the primary master 
controller. Any small minimal loss during the controller 
migration phase after failure can be offsetted by the idle 
timeout period as seen in the first experiment or by application 
level adaptation mechanisms.  The additional load on the 
secondary controller during the failure period did not overload 
the resources as found from the memory and processor usage. 
The proposed solution is robust and provides transparency 
to the physical and virtual switches and the traffic carried over 
them from fault and breakdown of the controllers in an SD-
WAN. This is one of the key components to maintain 
reliability of the SD-WAN infrastructure. Adequate 
orchestration and provisioning of network level QoS along 
with the proposed fault-tolerant platform can provide 
consistent QoE of the social multimedia applications on SD-
WAN. 
There are some optimizations possible on the proposed 
platform. At this moment, the copies of the flow rules are 
stored centrally at the cloud. As shown, this provides both 
redundancy and recovery from failure. Furthermore, the SCM 
control monitor is presently implemented as a single module. 
In a scalable SD-WAN network, this could be implemented as 
a NFV module and deployed in a cloud and offered as a cloud-
based network as a service (NaaS) function. These 
enhancements can further improve the response time of the 
system and hence the performance of the proposed platform. 
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